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ABSTRACT In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that gender diversity
could improve the economic and social performance of companies—although progress has
been painfully slow. In Italy, Law n. 120/2011 has required that since 2012 the composition of
corporate boards must comprise at least 1/5 women and, from 2015, 1/3 women. Here, our
primary aim was to study the proportion and the progression of female directors on the
boards of Italian companies over the period between 2009–2014, among a sample of 60
companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. We additionally studied the characteristics of
the women on the companies’ boards, in order to assemble a typical profile. To do this, we
verified the boards’ compositions, the number of female directors, women’s power on the
boards and their levels of education. Our results confirm that Italian law has produced
significant effects on the composition of corporate boards. Moreover, we found that female
directors are generally of Italian ethnic origin and have high levels of education, with a
master’s, and sometimes, post-master’s degree. Furthermore, female directors are more
likely to be professional figures with experience—the percentages of female directors with
professional qualifications as well as the percentage of female directors on boards of other
companies have consistently increased during the period mentioned. Our findings provide a
descriptive analysis of female directors during the period between 2009–2014, thereby
presenting a picture of gender equality in the Italian context. To our knowledge, this is the
first study that has focused on examining gender equality among Italian-listed companies
over such a long period. Future development of this research could examine in more depth
the differences between male and female presence, behaviour and characteristics on boards,
as well as how these issues affect the performance of firms. This article is published as part of
a collection on the role of women in management and the workplace.
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Introduction
The issue of gender balance in corporate contexts hasbecome a high-profile discussion point in recent years.Previous research on this issue can be categorised into
three main groupings: women entrepreneurs, working women
and women on corporate boards.
The role of women entrepreneurs. Until the 1970s, women in
business had always played a marginal role (Cesaroni and Sentuti
2014). Since the 1980s, there has been a global rise in the number
of women entrepreneurs, and, simultaneously, a rise in associated
research. Previous research on female entrepreneurs focused its
attention both on developed countries (Paoloni and Demartini,
2012; De Vita et al., 2014; Ahl and Nelson, 2015), and on
emerging and undeveloped countries (Della-Giusta and Phillips,
2006; Welsh et al., 2014). These studies investigated the effects
and the characteristics of female entrepreneurs (Danes et al.,
2007; Xavier et al., 2012; Cesaroni and Sentuti, 2014; Paoloni and
Dumay, 2015), their psychology and their motivation and the
differences with male entrepreneurs (Ahl, 2006; Powell and
Eddleston, 2008,2013; Ismail, 2014).
The presence of women in the corporate workforce. Research
falling under this category has specifically analysed the effects
produced in companies with a high level of female workforce.
These studies have shown that the female workforce tends to
exhibit greater attention to environmental behaviours (Hunter
et al., 2004) and to climate change (Ciocirlan and Pettersson,
2012), and has more positive work-related attitudes toward the
client organization (Selvarajan et al., 2015).
The presence of women on the boards of directors. Previous
research in this area has focused on the diversity of board
members, stating that a board with “different”members can make
better decisions in regard to the different contributions that each
director can give to business decisions. According to agency
theory, the board has a very important role in solving agency
problems and to ensuring a balance between the interests of
shareholders and managers. To this end, diversity can improve
the ability of the board: diversity on the board produces positive
effects due to different knowledge, skills, experiences, ideas and
behaviours. In accordance with stakeholder theory, a hetero-
geneous board can better satisfy the different requirements of
different company stakeholders and is a stronger monitor of
executive behaviour, as diversity brings varied viewpoints to
board oversight (Carter et al., 2003; Arfken et al., 2004; Konrad
et al., 2008; Adams and Funk, 2012).
In relation to this area, in this study we consider the level and
the evolution of the presence of female directors on the boards of
a sample of Italian-listed companies over the period between
2009–2014. We choose this period because of the issue of the
Italian Law n. 120/2011 (known as Golfo-Mosca Law), which
required that from 2012, in appointing a board women should
comprise at least one-fifth and, from 2015, one-third of boards,
up to 2022, when the Golfo-Mosca law will cease. As we will
discuss further, this law produced an increase of the presence of
women on boards. Italy took inspiration from other European
countries. In 2003, Norway passed a law mandating at least 40
percent representation of each gender on the board of publicly
listed companies. Many European countries have followed suit.
Most recently, Germany passed a law that requires publicly
listed companies to have women occupy at least 30 percent of
supervisory seats as of 2016. Overall, the introduction of quotas
has supported a substantial rise in the share of women on the
boards of Europe’s largest publicly listed companies.
Furthermore, we analyse women’s characteristics in order to
identify a typical profile.
Our first contribution is to do a descriptive analysis of the
presence of female directors from 2009–2014 among the sample
of companies selected. We therefore provide a picture of the
Italian situation in terms of gender equality. To our knowledge,
this is the first study that analyses the situation of Italian-listed
companies over such a long period. Previous research had studied
gender diversity on boards before the Italian law that stipulated
mandatory inclusion of women on corporate boards.
The second contribution of our study is to draw a women’s
profile to identify the characteristics that women need to enter the
boards of listed companies.
Our research aims to address the following practical questions:
 Is women’s participation only required by law or was it there
before 2012?
 Do women on boards really have any power?
 Do female directors belong to major shareholders or are they
external parties?
 What is a woman’s educational profile?
To our knowledge, no previous research studies have assessed
such questions in the Italian context.
Gender diversity on boards
Board diversity has been defined in different ways, but the
literature has mainly investigated the effects of nationality and
gender. In regard to gender diversity, despite a steady increase
achieved in recent years, there is still scant representation of
women on companies’ boards. According to a survey carried out
by the European Commission, in January 2012 the average board
representation of female directors was just 13.7% (European
Commission, 2012). In order to increase the participation of
women on a company’s board, the European Commission
launched the “Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”, a call
for all European companies willingness to sign a voluntary
commitment to increase the percentage of female directors to
30% by 2015 and to 40% by 2020. After this initiative, in 2011,
some Member States enacted legislative measures aimed to realize
equality between women and men on corporate boards. Despite
these advances, women still hold very little power on corporate
boards. In this regard, Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004), after
verifying the same characteristics between male and female
among directors, found that very few women in corporate boards
really had any power and were strategically well positioned. A
similar conclusion was found by Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) who
studied the effect of the Norwegian law, which required at least
40% representation of each sex for a public, limited company’s
board by 2008. They found an increase in the number of female
directors without any advance in their power.
In regard to gender diversity, Terjesen et al. (2009) carried out
a complete and thorough analysis of the existing literature on
women serving on corporate boards. Comparing previous
research, they identified three key areas: theoretical perspective,
characteristics and the presence of women on corporate boards.
In respect to the latter, previous research had investigated the
effects of the presence of women on corporate boards. Singh et al.
(2008) conducted a survey of a sample of the largest 100 UK
companies aimed to verify the differences between new male and
new female directors nominated in the period between 2001–
2004. Their results suggested that female directors—increasing
during the period—were less likely to have top management
experience in big companies and were more likely to have had
previous career experience in public and non-profit sectors and
on international boards.
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Adams and Ferreira (2009), in analysing a sample of firms by
Standard and Poors, found that female directors are less likely to
have attendance problems and also reduce the likelihood that
their male counterparts have attendance problems. Furthermore,
their results show that female directors are more likely to be
assigned to monitoring-related committees, and are less likely to
be assigned to a remuneration committee, compared to men.
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014) studied the relationship between
the level of CRS disclosure—measured through the KPMG report
2008—and companies with a board of at least three women. They
tested that companies in countries with higher proportion of
boards of directors with at least three women reported higher
levels of CRS.
Carter et al. (2010) investigated firms in the S&P 500 in the
period 1998–2002 to verify the relationship between a firm’s
performance—measured by the ROA and Q Tobin—and the
diversity on the board, in terms of women and race. Their results
revealed a positive and significant relationship between the
number of female directors and the ROA, while a non-significant
relationship was found with the Q Tobin.
***
In relation to Italy specifically, there are still few studies about
women on corporate boards. Drago et al. (2011) analysed Italian-
listed companies and highlighted the effects on company value
and performance of the interlocking women directors. They
focused on all interlocking directors over the period between 2003–
2010 to verify their gender and their role. They found a negative
relationship between interlocking directors (including female
interlocking directors) and the company’s value and performance
(measured by the equity value and the annual stock return).
Bianco et al. (2011, 2015) explored the board diversity on
Italian listed companies, to verify its drivers and its effects. With
reference to the characteristics of female directors, they verified
whether female directors have a family connection with the
controlling shareholder. At the end of 2009, the percentage was
47.3% (Bianco et al., 2011); at the end of 2010 was 55% (Bianco
et al., 2015). Their results show that women linked to the
shareholder family are more present in smaller companies, with
concentrated ownership, while women unrelated to the share-
holder family are present in bigger companies. With reference to
director characteristics of Italian-listed companies in the period
2008–2010, they verified that there is less likelihood that women
on the board are executive and independent directors. With
reference to the effects of female directors, they tested whether the
presence of female directors affects the board’s behaviour. Using a
regression model, they observed that a board with at least one
woman had a lower number of meetings and that women
performed worse than men in terms of meeting attendance.
Research design
As discussed in the context of Italy, in recent years there has been
a slight increase in the number of women on company boards. To
reverse this trend and to encourage the appointment of women
directors, Law n. 120 was enacted in 2011.
In our research, we studied the level and the evolution of the
presence of female directors on the boards of Italian companies
between 2009–2014, to verify firstly whether women’s participa-
tion on corporate boards was only required by law or whether it
existed before 2012. Second, we considered whether companies in
2014 have just adopted a board structure in line with the
obligations established by law for 2015. Furthermore, we have
sought to identify women’s characteristics. In particular, for each
female director we verified:
 Education
 Professional qualification
 Nationality
 Age
 If the woman is an executive director
 If the woman is also a shareholder
 If the woman is also busy on other boards
To identify the number of female directors on corporate
boards, we analysed the financial statement with specific reference
to the section on corporate bodies of each company for each year.
With a view to detect the characteristics of female directors, we
related to public curriculum vitae published on company websites
or elsewhere online. Since there are no relevant databases
available, we had to conduct a manual survey.
Sample selection
The sample is composed of 60 Italian firms listed on the Milan
Stock Exchange during the period between 2009–2014. Specifi-
cally, using the Datastream database, we excluded financial and
insurance firms that apply different accounting rules. We sorted
the non-financial companies according to their size, measured by
the total asset. Companies listed in each year of the period
between 2009–2014 were chosen in order to have a stable sample
for each year. We excluded companies delisted before 2014 and
those listed after 2009. Finally, we selected the 30 largest and the
30 smallest firms. We have chosen companies listed in each year
of the period between 2009–2014 to ensure stability of the sample
for each year.
Our sample of 60 companies listed can be classified into two
sub-samples: the first one consisting of the largest 30 companies
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange and the second consisting of
the smallest 30. Table 1 contains the companies within the sample
divided in two subsamples.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics. In our analysis, we identified the number
of female directors on each board and, among these, the number
of female directors that have real power on the corporate board.
To verify the power of female directors we chose to study the
number of female directors with proxies, although, clearly, there
are other strategies for identifying female directors’ power.
Tables 2 and 3 contain the descriptive statistics of the two
analysed variables: the number of female directors and the
number of female directors with proxies.
As evidenced from the tables, in the period between 2009–
2014, the number of female directors on the board ranges
between 0 to 5 with a steady increase of the average from 0.65 in
2009 to 2.47 in 2014. With reference to women with power, we
note that the number ranges between 0 to 2, with an increase of
the average level from 0.17 in 2009 to 0.33 in 2014. The median
shows that only by the total number of female directors there has
been an important increase; but for the number of female
directors with proxies, the median is stable and equal to 0 on the
whole period analysed.
Trends over the period between 2009–2014. As discussed, with
the enforcement of law n. 120/2011, there was clear growth of the
number of female directors in almost all companies within the
sample, as evidenced by the following graphs. (Figs. 1 and 2).
As evidenced by the above graphs, before law n. 120/2011,
many companies showed a lack of female directors. The blue, red
and green lines are often equal to zero. The purple line starts to
get up until the orange line that is the highest and shows that in
2014, just four companies did not have any women on their
corporate board (Tenaris, Gas Plus, Fiera Milano and
Pininfarina).
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Before the law, the involvement of women on corporate boards
was minimal. Only in 2014, the situation is in line with the
requirements for 2012, but it is still far from the provisions
for 2015.
To verify the level of the power of female directors in the
board, we estimated:
 The percentage of female directors on the board through the
ratio between the total female directors and the total of
directors on the board;
 The percentage of female directors with proxies through the
ratio between the total number of female directors with
delegated power and the total number of female directors of the
60 companies.
With reference to the percentage of female directors on boards,
the results show a clear increase of this ratio since 2012, the first
year of application of the new Italian law, but only in 2014 did the
percentage reach 1/5, as highlighted in Table 4.
With reference to the executive female directors, as evidenced
from the above table, despite the increase in the number of
women with proxies (from 10 in 2009 to 20 in 2014), there is a
steady reduction in the average rate (25.64% in 2009 and 13.51%
in 2014). It follows that the rate of increase in the number of
women with delegated power is lower than that of women in
the board.
From our results, it appears that law n. 120/2011 introduced a
gender balance that is more formal than substantial.
Analysis of the female director “profile” over the period
between 2009 and 2014. As discussed, we set out to provide a
profile to identify the characteristics that women on boards
possess. For this purpose, for each female director we verified the
education, the professional qualification, the nationality, the age,
whether the woman is also a shareholder, and whether the
woman is on boards of other companies.
Over the period assessed, there were increases in the number of
foreign female directors, the number of female directors that are
themselves shareholders of the companies and the number of
female directors also serving on boards of other companies. In
relation to the education, in the period there was an improvement
of the level of education, with an increase in the number of female
directors with a master’s degrees, post-master’s degrees, PhDs,
other qualifications (for example, for accountants, lawyers and so
on) and the number of female directors who are also university
Table 1 | Sample selection
1st Subsample name Total assets at 31/12/2014 2nd Subsample name Total assets at 31 December 2014
1 Enel 159.567.000 1 Snai 655.660
2 Exor Ord 145.593.000 2 Fnm 622.838
3 Eni 140.976.000 3 Reply 601.660
4 Fiat Chrysler 96.963.000 4 Diasorin 583.497
5 Telecom Italia 70.433.000 5 Datalogic 559.652
6 Atlantia 32.359.836 6 Save-Aep.Di Vnz.Mrc.Polo 555.541
7 Finmeccanica 26.731.000 7 Gas Plus 555.202
8 Snam 24.906.000 8 La Doria 553.658
9 Saipem 17.594.000 9 Seat Pagine Gialle 542.822
10 Terna Rete Elettrica Naz 15.059.200 10 Prelios 528.577
11 Tenaris 13.568.969 11 Yoox 445.050
12 A2A 10.010.000 12 Aedes Ligure Lombarda 435.204
13 Italmobiliare 9.622.951 13 Prima Industrie 396.105
14 Luxottica 9.406.098 14 Zignago Vetro 386.245
15 Italcementi Fabbriche Riunite 8.599.245 15 Biesse 364.575
16 Hera 8.364.630 16 Reno De Medici 363.296
17 Pirelli 7.424.475 17 Aeffe 360.490
18 Mediaset 7.107.500 18 Emak 340.032
19 Iren 6.629.401 19 Nice 313.177
20 Acea 6.615.421 20 Cairo Communication 308.398
21 Impregilo 6.531.241 21 Fiera Milano 266.181
22 Astm 6.135.641 22 El En 243.357
23 Cir Cie.Indi.Riun. 5.811.893 23 Basicnet 198.349
24 Sias 5.790.889 24 Sabaf 168.311
25 Prysmian 5.545.000 25 Bonifiche Ferraresi 159.601
26 Buzzi Unicem Rsp 5.108.132 26 Cembre 144.043
27 Danieli &.C Rsp 5.052.414 27 Pininfarina 141.318
28 Parmalat 4.582.100 28 Valsoia 82.378
29 Beni Stabili 4.384.493 29 Bastogi 47.316
30 Astaldi 4.068.001 30 Molmed 29.583
Table 2 | Female directors on boards—descriptive statistics
Female directors on boards
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 4 4 3 4 5 5
Mean 0.65 0.68 0.80 1.15 1.82 2.47
Median 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Table 3 | Female directors with delegated power—
descriptive statistics
Female directors with delegated power
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1 1 2 2
Mean 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.33
Median 0 0 0 0 0 0
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professors. The average age of female directors, after an increase
in the period between 2009 and 2011, is constant at 51.
To better understand the phenomena explained in Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4, we estimated the percentage among the total number of
female directors. As shown in Table 5 “female directors” in our
sample are in more than 90% of cases Italian and in most cases,
they are professional figures, not belonging to the families that
control the company, and are also involved on other boards.
The analysis of the level of the education shows that the profile
“female director” in our sample is a woman with master’s degree
and in limited cases with academic experiences and rarely with a
PhD. In most cases, “female directors” in our sample are
professional figures, with post-master’s degrees and other
qualifications.
Conclusions
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that gender
diversity could improve the economic and the social performance
of companies, but the progress has been painfully slow. In Italy,
Law n. 120/2011 required that from 2012, boards should
comprise at least 1/5 and from 2015 1/3 of women. Here our
first aim was to study the level and the evolution of the presence
of female directors on the boards of Italian-listed companies over
the period between 2009 and 2014. The results confirm that the
new law has produced effects on the composition of corporate
boards. In 2014, only four companies in our sample had not
appointed women on the board at all (Tenaris, Gas Plus, Fiera
Milano and Pininfarina).
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Figure 1 | The trend of female directors of the sample of the 30 biggest companies in the period between 2009 and 2014.
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Figure 2 | The trend of female directors of the sample of the 30 smallest companies in the period between 2009 and 2014.
Table 4 | Trend and percentage of female directors on boards and of female directors with delegated power
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Female directors 39 41 48 69 109 148
Average percentage of women on board 6.61% 6.74% 7.56% 10.77% 16,11% 22.69%
Female directors with delegated power 10 10 11 11 14 20
Percentage of executive female directors on total female directors 25.64% 24.39% 22.92% 15.94% 12.84% 13.51%
Figure 3 | The characteristics of female directors on boards in the period
between 2009 and 2014.
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If the law has been effective in terms of the presence of women
on boards, the same effects were not apparent with reference to
the power of women directors. In fact, compared to a constant
increase in the average number of female directors (from 6.61% in
2009 to 22.69% in 2014), the results show a decrease in the
percentage of women with proxies (from 25.64% in 2009 to
13.51% in 2014). It follows that the law introduced a gender
balance of more form than substance.
Our second aim was to study the characteristics of women on a
company boards to identify a typical profile. Our results show
that female directors are generally Italian and have a high level of
education, with master’s degrees and sometimes post-master’s
degrees. Most likely the high levels of education come from the
fact that women are still a minority in the world of business and a
demonstration of further qualifications and titles is needed to
secure appointments to corporate boards. Furthermore, female
directors are more likely professional figures, with experience
(average age of 51 years), the percentage of female directors with
professional qualifications has consistently increased over the
period (from 34.21% in 2009 to 49.34% in 2014), and the
percentage of female directors busy on boards of other companies
(from 50% in 2009 to 65.13% in 2014). We also see that the
number of female directors who are shareholders has undergone
a constant decrease in the period. Instead of appointing women
belonging to the shareholder’s family, companies have preferred
to appoint external female directors.
The increasing percentage of women engaged in other boards
confirms the interlocking phenomenon in Italy. In this way, the
vast majority of Italian listed companies are connected in a single
network through a small minority of administrators.
Our study has some limitations: first, we have analysed just a
sample of Italian-listed companies. In the future an analysis that
involves all Italian-listed companies would clearly be useful. Second,
to verify the power of female directors, we considered executive
female directors. There are of course other ways to identify power on
boards (for example, the role of President, of CEO, the appointment
to important committees and so on). Finally, we gathered data only
from publicly available information—as such, it is possible that some
data could be incomplete.
Our article represents a first step toward developing an
understanding of the levels of gender equality on the boards of
Italian-listed companies. Future research could explore the
differences between male and female presence, behaviour and
characteristics on boards. Consequently, it would also be
interesting to assess the effect of gender equality on the
performance of firms. Furthermore, analysing whether the
presence of women on boards could affect the CSR disclosure
and CSR activity of the company, would be worthwhile.
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